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The Market Evaluation of Human Capital: 
The Case of Indentured Servitude 
David W. Galenson 
University of Chiago and California Institute of Technology 
This paper examines the market for human capital created by the 
institution of indentured servitude in colonial America. The inden- 
ture system allowed English emigrants to obtain passage to the 
colonies by selling claims on their future labor. With the size of the 
debt approximately equal for all emigrants, the length of the term 
for which a servant was bound is predicted to have varied inversely 
with expected productivity in the colonies. Analysis of two collections 
of contracts made in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries sup- 
ports the prediction. Age, skill, and literacy were negatively related 
to length of indenture. Women received shorter terms than men at 
young ages, while servants bound for the West Indies and those 
bound in periods of high colonial demand for labor also received 
reductions. 
I. Introduction 
During the colonial period of American history, two institutions 
existed which provided for the explicit valuation of stocks of human 
capital in the market. One of these was slavery, under which blacks 
and their progeny were held in service for life. The other was in- 
dentured servitude, under which whites were bound to service for 
limited periods of time. 
I am grateful to Stanley Engerman for discussions of many of the issues treated in 
this paper and comments on an earlier draft. I would also like to thank Andrew Abel, 
Gary Becker, Lance Davis, Robert Fogel, Richard Freeman, Russell Menard, Frederic 
Mishkin, Melvin Reder, Sherwin Rosen, T. W. Schultz, George Stigler, and participants 
in seminars at Columbia University, the University of Chicago, the University of 
Illinois, the Newberry Library, the University of Southampton, and the 1980 Cliomet- 
rics Conference for their suggestions and comments. 
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As a result of both its direct importance for the history of the 
nineteenth century and its indirect importance for the history of the 
twentieth, slavery has long been one of the central concerns of Ameri- 
can social and economic historians. However, in the labor markets of 
many regions, for substantial periods during the first half of the 
colonial era, indentured servitude was of greater quantitative impor- 
tance than slavery.1 In the eighteenth century the quantitative 
significance of indentured servitude declined in most of these areas, as 
slaves were substituted for servants in the sugar fields of the West 
Indies, in the tobacco fields of the Chesapeake colonies, and in the 
rice fields of South Carolina.2 Yet indentured servitude nonetheless 
continued to perform an important role in the colonial labor market 
by providing skilled craftsmen and managers to the large plantations 
of the West Indies and the southern mainland colonies.3 
The essential difference between servitude and slavery was that it 
was the labor of the servant, rather than the person, which was bought 
and sold. Because less attention has been devoted to the study of 
indentured servitude, we are less familiar with the history of the 
institution. An economic investigation of its functioning, based on the 
analysis of quantitative data generated by the operation of the market 
for servants, can therefore serve a dual purpose: It can provide 
evidence of how capital values were established when claims on the 
labor of humans for long periods were traded in the market, while at 
the same time increasing our understanding of the economic basis of 
white servitude in colonial America.4 
II. The Indenture Bargain 
Indentured servitude was a credit system under which human labor 
was leased. It functioned through two markets linked by a recruiting 
agent. In England, in the first market, a prospective servant signed a 
' An example is Maryland, where a study of probate inventories has indicated that as 
late as 1674-79 the ratio of servants to slaves held in estates was 3.88 (Menard 1977b, p. 
360). It should be pointed out that in some areas neither type of bound labor was 
quantitatively important. Slaves never accounted for more than 3 percent of New 
England's total population in the colonial period, and the share of servants was 
probably of a similar magnitude (Greene 1942, chap. 3; Abbot Emerson Smith 1947, 
pp. 28-29). A generalization that held for a number of major colonial regions is that the 
share of bound workers in a region's labor force tended to rise as one traveled south 
from New England, with progressively increasing shares in the middle colonies, the 
Chesapeake, South Carolina, and the West Indies. For evidence on population 
composition, see Greene and Harrington (1932), Sutherland (1936), and Wells (1975). 
2 For accounts of this process in the West Indies, see Dunn (1973); for the 
Chesapeake, see Menard (1977b); for South Carolina, see Wood (1975). 
3On this change, see Gray (1958, 1:350) and Pares (1960, p. 19); for additional 
evidence see Galenson (1979a, chap. 10). 
4The present paper extends the analysis and empirical findings of Galenson (1977b). 
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contract, or "indenture," with a merchant, promising to serve the 
latter or his assignees in a particular colony for a given period under 
stated conditions. The servant was then transported to the specified 
colonial destination, where the merchant or his representative sold his 
contract to a colonial planter or farmer in the second market. In 
return for the commitment of his labor, the servant received passage 
to the designated colony, maintenance during the term of the con- 
tract, and certain freedom dues at its conclusion. Once signed, the 
indenture was negotiable property, and at any time before its conclu- 
sion the servant could be sold to a new master for the balance of his 
term. When the contract expired, the servant became free. The con- 
ditions of servitude were regulated by colonial statutes as well as by 
agreements written into the contracts. The terms of the contract were 
binding upon both master and servant. 
The indenture system normally operated within a context of com- 
petitive markets both in England and in the colonies. Servants were 
one important available backhaul cargo for English ships engaged in 
the trade for colonial sugar, tobacco, rice, and other agricultural 
staples.5 Contemporary fare quotations indicate that the charges for 
passage from England to America were uniform at a given time for all 
individuals and did not vary by specific colonial destination.6 
The planter's demand for indentured servants was based on his 
calculation of the discounted value of their net future earnings, after 
deducting the expected costs of the servant to him. The present value 
of the servant to the planter therefore depended upon the expected 
value of the servant's output in each year of the contract; the expected 
cost of maintenance, supervision, and training for the servant during 
each year of the term; the discount rate; and the value of the freedom 
dues to be paid to the servant. These, or analogous variables, are the 
same considerations which enter into the derivation of a free worker's 
net age-wealth profile (Becker 1975, p. 223). Yet one critical differ- 
ence is that, whereas for free workers evidence on flows is used to 
calculate the values of capital stocks, in the case of servants these 
calculations were performed by planters, who based their demand for 
stocks of bound labor for fixed terms on their calculations involving 
5 See Bruce 1907, 1:622; Smith 1947, p. 39; and Middleton 1953, pp. 145-56. 
6 While ?6 was the fare cited in the early colonial period, after the middle of the 
seventeenth century ?5 was the fare normally quoted for passage to all colonies. For 
references to quotations of passage charges from England to a number of colonies, see, 
e.g., John Smith (1624, pt. 1, p. 162); Purchas (1625, pt. 4, p. 1791); Bullock (1649, p. 
47); Taunton (January 4, 1670); Wilson (1682, p. 19); Littleton (1689, p. 17);Jeaffreson 
(1878, pt. 2, p. 102); Kingsbury (1906, pt. 1, pp. 277-78); Abbot Emerson Smith (1947, 
p. 35); and Alexander (1972, p. 45). A qualification to the statement in the text is 
possible seasonal variation in the cost of delivering servants to some colonies, discussed 
below. 
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the relevant flows. Therefore, like the slave market, the market for 
indentured labor produced capital values, and the flows underlying 
these must be inferred. 
The institutional arrangements which provided for the ownership 
of human capital for discrete periods produced potential differences 
between the patterns of human-capital values under indentured ser- 
vitude and those implicit in the operation of free labor markets. An 
advantage of the indenture system for the planter, relative to the 
hiring of free workers, was the greater control it gave him over 
the servant's time and effort once the bargain was made. Because the 
servant would have been compensated for his loss of freedom, in the 
absence of uncertainty, the price of indentured human capital would 
have been higher than that of free workers.7 However, in practice, 
uncertainty makes the direction of the inequality between these prices 
unpredictable without additional information, for it cannot be deter- 
mined a priori whether the insurance value of the contracts was 
normally greater to the planter or the servant.8 
All servants who migrated to America incurred debts of similar 
value. As noted above, passage charges were uniform for all servants, 
and maintenance costs and freedom dues varied little across indi- 
viduals. As a result, every servant contract was a promise to repay 
approximately the same sum of money. Therefore, the present dis- 
counted value of every servant's contract should have been approxi- 
inately the same at the time of binding. Since the productivity of 
servants varied, the conditions of their indentures had to vary. The 
higher ther servant's marginal-value product above his maintenance, 
the faster he could repay the loan made to him, and the shorter the 
term of the contract. The length of indenture across servants 
should, therefore, have been negatively correlated with individual 
productivity or, equivalently, with the market valuation of the current 
flow of income generated by the individual's stock of human capital. 
7'this assumes a solution to the problem of monitoring the servant's work in which 
the productivity gains from the master's control over the servant's time and effort were 
not of Iset by shirking. 
8 In a world in which futures contracts for free wage labor could be made with certain 
fulfillmnent, the present value of an indenture for a given number of years and of a 
series of contracts for hires for the same years would differ only by a premium which 
Voul td reimburse the servant for the loss of freedom resulting from his residence in the 
master's household and due to other legal provisions governing servitude. However, in 
the absence of these guaranteed futures contracts, in some cases the master might also 
have been willing to pay more for an indenture because of the assurance it gave him of 
labor supply inI peak seasons or future years; similarly, workers might sometimes have 
been willing to accept lower implicit wages in return for the guarantee of employment 
the indenture represented. The relative cost of this insurance to master and servant 
could vary, and as a result the relation between the implicit wage paid to servants and 
the hire rate for free workers is indeterminate. 
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Strictly, if costs had been precisely the same for all servants, all 
should have been bound on conditions that would yield the same 
expected price on arrival in the colonies. This, of course, does not 
imply that no variation should have occurred in the realized auction 
prices of servants in the colonies, for random disturbances between 
the time of binding and auction-such as illnesses of servants during 
the voyage or changes in the price of colonial outputs-could have 
produced differences between actual and expected prices. What the 
analysis does imply, however, is that if the market for contracts of 
servitude was efficient, variation in servants' auction prices should 
have been uncorrelated with all the characteristics of the servants 
which were known at the time of making the indenture bargain.9 
Very little evidence of the prices of newly arrived servants at colo- 
nial auctions has survived: From the entire colonial period the only 
known records of auctions of English servants come from the ac- 
counts of two ships, the Tristam and Jeane, which sold 68 servants in 
Virginia in late 1636 or 1637, and the Abraham, which sold 56 servants 
in Barbados in January 1637 (London, Public Record Office, 1636, 
1637). The listings of the amounts paid for the servants show that the 
median and modal prices of both men and women were identical- 
500 pounds of tobacco-in both auctions. Thus, although as will be 
seen both sex and colonial destination had a significant effect on the 
length of servants' indentures, the available evidence, though limited, 
suggests that neither may have affected the initial colonial auction 
prices for the servants. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
variable dimensions of the contract were adjusted for the servants' 
characteristics so as to make the expected auction prices of all servants 
the same. 
The relation between auction prices of servants and the simple cost 
of passage is also of interest. The modal price of 500 pounds of tobacco 
observed in the auctions was 11 percent greater than the fare that two 
free passengers each paid for passage to Virginia on the Tristam and 
jeane on the same voyage as the servants and 4 percent above the fare 
quoted elsewhere for passage from England to Maryland in 1638.10 
This statement neglects one potential element of cost. The marginal cost of delivery, 
and therefore auction prices, would have included any costs the merchant incurred in 
recruiting servants in England. These could clearly vary across individual servants, 
producing differences in expected auction prices. These costs could have been corre- 
lated with individual productivity, as in some instances skilled servants were given 
lump-suin payments at the time of binding. For some evidence of this practice, see the 
analysis of the Middlesex sample in the Appendix. 
10 The two free passengers each paid 450 pounds of tobacco (London, Public Record 
Office 1637). For the 1637 Chesapeake farm price of tobacco, see Menard (1975, p. 
475). The fare quotation, of ?6 sterling per person, is in Maryland Historical Society 
(1889, p. 206). 
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That in these cases the typical auction prices tended to be higher than 
the fare may have been due to the cost of recruiting servants, or to the 
existence of a premium received by merchants for bearing the risk of 
servant mortality on the ocean voyage. 
Related evidence on the nature of the labor-market equilibrium in 
the colonies which induced flows of labor from England is available 
from surviving valuations of indentured servants recorded in Mary- 
land for probate courts. The mean price of 28 male servants with 4 
remaining years of servitude recorded on Maryland's lower western 
shore during 1704-57 was ?8.95, with a median of ?9 and a mode of 
?10; while the mean price of 19 females with 4 years remaining was 
?7.75, with a median of ?8 and a mode of ?10.11 The typical marginal 
cost to an English merchant of delivering servants to the colonies 
cannot be estimated precisely but probably fell within a range 
bounded at the lower end by ?5, the usual cost of passage, and at the 
upper end by the ?10 estimated by Abbot Emerson Smith as the 
maximum expense of delivery. 12 The evidence of the probate 
valuations-although again limited in quantity-suggests that the 
central tendency of the colonial price of servants did fall within this 
range and, therefore, offers additional support for the hypothesis 
that the price of a servant's indenture in the colonies was equal to the 
marginal cost of delivering labor there from England. 
A number of other general considerations relating to the adjust- 
ment of the bargain deserve mention. One is the role of mortality. 
The smaller the probability of a servant's serving a given year of his 
term, the lower his expected net earnings and, ceteris paribus, the less 
favorable the terms of the contract he would be able to sign. This is 
true whether the mortality in question is that during the Atlantic 
crossing, when the merchant bore the risk, or that after arrival in the 
colonies, when the planter had purchased the contract and assumed 
the risk.'3 
A second factor with a similar effect was the possibility of a servant 
failing to serve out his term for a reason other than death, principally 
I am grateful to the St. Mary's City commission, Annapolis, Maryland, for tran- 
scriptions of the probate price quotations, from Maryland Hall of Records. Most of 
the quotations are from the early decades of the period; on devaluation of Maryland 
currency and its reflection in probate valuations, see Main (1972, pp. 14-18) and 
McCusker (1978, pp. 189-204). 
12 Smith 1947, p. 37. A precise analysis would include a positive premium in the 
probate valuations, for these servants had normally been "seasoned," i.e., had spent a 
year in the new colonial disease environment, and consequently had a longer life 
expectancy than the new arrivals, ceteris paribus. 
13 Mortality rates differed among colonies, and the effects of' this on the length of' 
indenture will be discussed below. The assumption here will be that mortality rates 
among servants both (luring passage and in the colonies were not systematically related 
to individual productivity. 
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running away. All the colonies enacted legislation intended to dis- 
courage servants from running away; of these some were preventive 
measures and others punitive. While some colonies provided for 
corporal-and even capital-punishment for runaways, the most 
common penalty was extension of the servant's contract by some 
multiple of the time he was absent.'4 One of the provisions of the 
contract, the servant's freedom dues, constituted a nonvested pension 
and, therefore, also acted to discourage servants from running away. 
While the form and worth of the dues varied across colonies and over 
time, they were often of substantial value and could have constituted a 
significant deterrent to servants who considered escaping from their 
masters.'5 
Servants were not allowed to marry during their terms. Since, by 
English practice, the expense of raising the illegitimate children of 
servants fell on the county, colonial legislation provided that the 
father should be discovered by oath of the mother and that he should 
reimburse the county for the expense of raising the child until it could 
be bound out to work. Since servants could not normally pay this sum, 
either the master would pay it and the servant's term would be 
extended, or the servant would be bound over to the county for an 
additional term after the conclusion of his normal term, to be sold for 
the necessary amount. The mother's term was also extended to reim- 
burse the master for her lost working time. 
III. Empirical Results 
The principal sources of quantitative evidence bearing on this market 
for human capital are servant contracts recorded and held in English 
14 For references to laws relating to runaways, see Semmes (1938, pp. 116-18) and 
Smith (1947, pp. 264-70). The strong terms of this colonial legislation were an impor- 
tant element in the inctenture system's success, and some authors have argued that 
changes in the legal provisions for the enforcement of' contracts were central to its 
decline in the early nineteenth century; see, e.g., Geiser 1901, p. 42. Similarly, the lack 
of' success of' the attempt to revive a contract labor system during 1864-85 has been 
attributed in part to the high cost of enforcing contracts through civil action; see 
Erickson 1957, pp. 46-48. 
13 On freedom dues, see Smith (1947, pp. 238-41) and Heavner (1976, pp. 50-51). 
For a discussion of an analogous provision, nonvested pensions as a firm's insurance 
against quits, see Becker (1975, p. 34). '[he nature of freedom dues has some implica- 
tions for other dimensions of the servant contract. TYhe dues were specified by colonial 
law and were equal for all servants in a given colony. Therefore, the discounted cost of 
the (tues to the planter at the time he purchased a contract varied inversely with the 
length of the contract. One effect of the fixed nominal value of the freedom dues may, 
therefore, have been to reduce the amount of variation in the length and other 
dimensions of the contracts, since the variations in the latter were intended to equalize 
the net present values of' all contracts. This point should not obscure another basic 
effect of the existence of freedom dues, for, ceteris paribus, they raised the cost of 
servants and therefore tended to lengthen the term of indenture. 
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courts. These were made both to protect servants from kidnapping 
and to protect merchants from false charges of kidnapping. The two 
largest known surviving collections will be analyzed here; the earlier 
set, recorded in Middlesex during 1683-84, covers a total of 812 
individuals, while the later, recorded in London during 1718-59, 
covers 3,187 servants. 
The principal variable analyzed here will be the length of the 
indenture. Furthermore, this analysis will be done only for the minors 
in both samples; these comprise 22 percent of the servants with 
known ages in the earlier and 67 percent in the later sample. The 
selection of the variable to be analyzed and of the minors follows from 
consideration of the evidence of the contracts. It is clear that 4 years 
was the normal duration of an adult's indenture in both samples, yet 
for a combination of legal and clerical reasons the full set of condi- 
tions of adults' servitude do not appear to have been recorded in 
either set of indentures. For minors, the full conditions do appear to 
have been recorded, and the duration of the contract appears to have 
been the chief variable dimension of the contracts. Both variations in 
freedom dues and restrictions on the servants' occupations in the 
colonies were rare. Cash payments made to adults were not generally 
recorded in the later sample, but the contracts of the minors, on 
which they do appear to be recorded conscientiously, show that 
fewer than 6 percent received cash payments. Some cash payments 
are recorded for both minors and adults in the earlier sample, and 
although it is uncertain whether payments were recorded in all cases 
in which they were made, less than 7 percent of the contracts contain 
such entries. A notable feature of the payments recorded in both 
samples is that virtually all-95 percent in the earlier and 97 percent 
in the later sample-were made to servants bound for 4 years. Insofar 
as payments were made (or promised) and recorded, analysis of the 
characteristics of servants who received them tends to reinforce 
the results obtained from the analysis of the length of indenture.'6 
The evidence of both samples, therefore, indicates that for minors the 
greatest variation in the conditions of indenture occurred in the 
duration of the term of servitude, while for adults this was not the 
case, as 4 years was both the standard term for adults and normally 
the minimum term assigned.17 For adults, cash payments were appar- 
16 See the Appendix. 
17 7erms of less than 4 years do occur, but they appear to have been rare after the 
rnidseventeenth century; thus, they account for only 0.5 percent of all indentures of 
known length in the Middlesex registrations of 1683-84 and 1.2 percent of those in the 
London registrations of 1718-59. The reasons for this are not known. Four years may 
have been the term required at most times and places for the average adult to repay the 
cost of passage out of his net earnings, but it is unclear why shorter terms were not 
more often given to highly skilled servants like the accountant James Corss, whom 
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ently substituted for reductions in the length of servitude below 4 
years. 
Earlier analysis suggested that a servant's term of indenture would 
be inversely related to the market valuation of his stock of human 
capital. This index of the servant's human capital can be related to a 
number of observable characteristics potentially relevant to the de- 
termination of the present value of that stock. When this is done by 
multiple-regression analysis, the estimating equation differs from the 
common hedonic method only in the use of an index for price. The 
estimated coefficients of the independent variables age, sex, literacy, 
and occupation can be interpreted as the marginal prices paid for 
servants' characteristics in units of the index, while those of desti- 
nations represent compensating differentials among regions.18 
Fable 1 shows a number of the basic relationships underlying the 
market valuation of the servants. In both samples, the length of 
indenture was negatively related to both age and skill: With other 
things equal, servants with skilled occupations and those able to sign 
received shorter terms. Women received shorter terms than men, 
ceteris paribus, and servants bound for the West Indies received 
shorter terms than those bound for the North American mainland. 
A comparison of the estimated coefficients of the sex variable across 
samples indicates that, on average, women received considerably 
larger reductions in their terms in the 1680s than in the eighteenth 
century. This decline in the premium for females is not surprising in 
view of the generally declining colonial sex ratios during this period, 
for while women were preferred for some kinds of household work 
and some types of farming, their increasing relative availability in 
most colonies would be expected to lower the size of their wage 
differentials. 1s 
Table 2 provides a more detailed analysis of the length of indenture 
for the later sample, allowing separate age profiles of length of inden- 
ture by sex and skill. It reveals that there was a tendency for women 
to receive indentures from 5 to 15 percent shorter than those of men 
through the age of 17, while for servants aged 18-20 there was no 
Walter Tullideph sent to the manager of his plantation in Antigua in 1759 with a note 
stating that he "hath bound himself to serve me four years agreeable to the Laws of 
Antigua, but as he is 22 years of Age, he thought it hard to serve so long and for that 
reason, I have given him a Certificate that he is to be absolved from the last year's 
Service" (Fullideph 1759, vol. 3). That planters preferred to substitute salaries for 
reductions of the term below 4 years suggests the possibility that fixed costs of hiring 
and/or a desire to capture the returns from a servant's general training in the colony 
may have been important considerations. 
18 On the interpretation of coefficients in hedonic price indexes, see Rosen (1974, pp. 
34-35). 
19 Ihe difference between samples in the sex coefficients in table 1 is significant at the 
.01 level. On declining colonial sex ratios, see Wells (1975, pp. 156, 219, 244). 
TABLE 1 
ESTIMATED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, MIDDLESEX AND LONDON SAMPLES 
MIDDLESEX, 1683-84 LONDON, 1718-59 
Estimated Standard Estimated Standard 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE Coefficient Error Coefficient Error 
Age (years):a 
Total sample: 
Less than 15 2.655 .385 2.749 .134 
15 2.201 .400 2.147 .080 
16 1.457 .304 1.304 .068 
17 .893 .367 .728 .062 
18 .174 .270 .331 .055 
19 .738 .306 .169 .050 
Sexb - 1.484 .207 -.195 .073 
Literacy -.575 .217 -.082 .037 
Dated ... ... - .0060 .0023 
Tradee - .727 .445 ... ... 
Farmer' ... ... -.313 .074 
Laborer ... ... -.146 .079 
Services ... ... - .348 .066 
Metal and construction ... ... -.320 .067 
Clothing and textiles ... ... -.313 .060 
Antiguaj -.227 .812 -.403 .110 
Barbados -.553 .274 -.176 .154 
Jamaica - .398 .462 - .233 .060 
Other West Indiesk -.401 1.094 -.479 .088 
Maryland .203 .209 .306 .059 
Virginia ... ... .127 .073 
Other mainland' -.389 .673 .050 .116 
Constant 5.227 ... 4.665 ... 
R 2 .555 ... .539 ... 
F 12.87 ... 112.82 ... 
n 171 ... 2,049 ... 
SOURCE-Data used are all from records of minors (age less than 21). Middlesex, 1683-84: London, Greater 
London Record Office; Nicholson (1965); Wareing (1976). London, 1718-59: London, Corporation of London 
Records Office; Kaminkow and Kaminkow (1964); Galenson (1977a). 
NOTE.-Dependent variable = number of years indentured; method of estimation used is ordinary least squares 
in tables 1 and 2. 
aFor age variable, indicated age = 1; zero class = age 20. 
b Male = 0, female = 1. 
e Marked = 0, signed = 1. 
d Date entered as final two digits of year of registration. 
eTrade = 0 for laborers and no recorded occupations; trade = 1 for all other men's occupations. 
I For all occupational variables, indicated occupations) = 1; zero class = no recorded occupation. "Farmer" 
includes husbandman, plowman, etc. 
gIncludes accountant, barber, surgeon, etc. 
h Includes blacksmith, carpenter, cooper, mason, etc. 
Includes clothier, tailor, weaver, etc. 
For all destination variables, for Middlesex sample, zero class = Virginia; for London sample, zero class 
Pennsylvania. 
k Includes Nevis, St. Christopher, etc. 
Includes Carolina, New York, etc. 
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'TABLE 2 
ESI IMATEI REGRESSION COEFFICIENTIS, LoNDI)ON SAMPLE, 1718-59 
Independent Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error 
Age (years): 
Total sample: 
Less than 15 2.976 .144 
15 2.378 .092 
16 1.542 .084 
17 .959 .084 
18 .473 .079 
19 .260 .083 
Women, age:a 
Less than 15 - 1.034 .460 
15 -.472 .390 
16 -.969 .228 
17 -.302 .161 
18 .041 .159 
19 .090 .135 
20 .198 .156 
Trade, age:b 
15 - 1.496 .392 
16 -.884 .206 
17 -.502 .117 
18 -.275 .085 
19 -.224 .073 
20 -.103 .076 
Literacy -.076 .036 
Date -.0093 .0024 
Antiguac - .260 .235 
Barbados - .005 .268 
Jamaica -..084 .209 
Other West Indies -.363 .221 
Maryland .194 .063 
Other mainland -..039 .072 
Februaryd -.100 .092 
March .171 .113 
April .156 .119 
May -.095 .164 
June -.431 .132 
July -.196 .113 
August - .486 .098 
September - .223 .096 
October - .400 .101 
November -.225 .100 
December .014 .097 
Sugar -.0162 .0074 
Constant 4.830 ... 
R2 .566 ... 
F 52.06 ... 
n 2,044 ... 
SOUIRoCE.-Ll1(1d, (Corporation of London Records Office; Kaminkow and Kaminkow (1964); (Galenisoni ( 1977a). 
NOIES.-See table I for variables not defined here. 
a FeiFale age interactions: indicated variable = I for women of given age. 
bIrade age interactions: indicated variable = I ftor men of given age who recorded a trade (as tlefineti in table 1). 
' For destinations, zero class = Virginia. 
d For months, zero class = January. Separate interaction terms between West Indian destination and month of 
registration were included in the equation, but their coefficients were generally small in value and are not reported. 
e Sugar = average annual price of muscovado sugar in London, in shillings per hundredweight, lagged I year, for 
servants bound for West Indies (Sheridan [1974, pp. 496-97], with linear interpolation for 1717-20 and 1727). 
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difference in the length of term by sex. In a suggestive parallel result, 
Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman found that, excluding the value 
of childbearing, the net earnings of female slaves were greater than 
those of men prior to the age of 18, apparently due to the more rapid 
physical maturation of women.20 The sex differentials in the terms of 
young indentured servants might have resulted from the same 
source. 
The results of table 1 indicate that premia for skills were reflected 
in the length of servants' indentures. The more detailed specification 
of the occupations presented in table 1 for the London sample indi- 
cates that the marginal premium paid for servants in each of four 
occupational categories-farmers, services, metal and construction 
crafts, and clothing and textile trades-was virtually the same.21 Un- 
skilled laborers received terms longer than servants with skilled occu- 
pations but shorter than those with no recorded occupations;22 the 
latter result may indicate that some premium was paid for the labor- 
ers' work experience. 
Economists have devoted considerable attention to the analysis of 
the relationship between productivity and age and have accumulated 
much evidence on the association between age and wages in recent 
periods. Less is known of the nature of this relation in past times. It is, 
therefore, of some interest to consider in more detail the implications 
of the estimated relationships between age and length of indenture 
for the age-earnings profiles of servants.23 Table 3 presents estimates 
of the relative annual net earnings of servants by age for unskilled 
and skilled men. The calculations are based on the assumption that 
the expected colonial sale price of each individual's contract was equal 
to the constant marginal cost of delivering servants to the colonies.24 
The relationship between age and net earnings is assumed to have 
been linear, making average net productivity during the term equal to 
net productivity at the term's midpoint. The estimates of average net 
20 Fogel and Engermian 1974. p. 77; see also Metzer 1975, pp. 136-37. Interestingly, 
evidence on the hourly earnings of North Carolina cotton mill employees in 1907 
indicates that average female earnings were above those of males through the age of 15, 
equal at 16, and below male earnings thereafter (Wright 1980, p. 6). 
21 None of the four coefficients is significantly different from any of the other three at 
the .10 level. On the value of skilled servants in the colonies, see, e.g., Martin (1761, vol. 
4, fol. 97, verso); Jeaffreson (1878, 1:186); and Galenson (1979a, pp. 314-19). 
22 The coefficient of laborer for the London sample in table 1 is significantly different 
from that of farmer at the .10 level for a one-tailed t-test, from those of metal- 
construction and clothing-textiles at .05, and from that of services at .025. 
23 it might be noted that the erratic behavior of the coefficients of higher ages in table 
1 for the Middlesex sample may have been due to the falsification of the ages of some 
servants. Fhis may have resulted from the legal requirements under which the regis- 
trations were made; for discussion and evidence see Galenson (1979a, appendix to 
chap. 3). 
24 Possible seasonal variation in delivery costs has been controlled for in the equation 
reported in table 2. 
458 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
productivity are derived from the following formulation of the mean 
present value of the contracts of servants of agej at the beginning of 
the term: 
n 
P V = E1 N I-W 
i= (1 + r)i 
where NP = expected mean annual net productivity during the term; 
n = mean length of term for servants in each entering age group; 
w - mean annual wage payments made to servants during the 
term; r = discount rate. 
To solve for the value of NP for each entering cohort, the mean 
present value of the contracts was set equal to ?10, an estimate of the 
marginal cost of delivering servants to the colonies. The mean age of 
each group at the time of binding was taken as the recorded age plus 
one-half year to allow for the rounding of age upon registration. The 
mean length of term by age was derived from the coefficients of table 
2, while the mean annual wage payments were taken directly from the 
indenture contracts.25 The estimates were made with a discount rate 
of 10 percent. 
The estimates of table 3, which indicate that the net-earnings 
profile of skilled servants was steeper than that of the unskilled, are 
consistent with the normal positive relationship between the steepness 
of age-earnings profiles and training. The ages at which the servants 
considered here were bound, between 15 and 20, were prime ones for 
training in a wide variety of skilled crafts in preindustrial England, 
through either apprenticeship or less formal arrangements. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that the net productivity of those in skilled 
trades rose rapidly during this period of the life cycle. 
Skilled servants received a considerable premium: Even at age 15, a 
2, No wages were recorded for unskilled servants. The average wage payments 
received by the skilled servants in the London sample by age were as in the table below. 
IThe present value of freedom dues at the time of binding varied across colonies and 
over time, according to differences and changes in legislation and with changes in the 
value of colonial currencies and commodities. No explicit allowance has been made for 
the dues in the calculation because of the difficulty of estimating their typical value; 
inclusion of the effect of the lump-sum payment would lower the estimates of the net 
annual earnings of servants without changing their relative values by age. 
Age (Years) Mean Annual Wage (?) 
15 .0 
16 .40 
17 .79 
18 1.45 
19 1.52 
20 3.02 
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TABLE 3 
ESTIMATED RELATIVE NET ANNUAL EARNINGS OF SERVANTS BY AGE 
UNSKILLED SKILLED 
Mean Net Mean Net 
Annual Relative Annual Relative 
Earnings Net Earnings Earnings Net Earnings 
Age (?) (Age 22.9 = 1.00) Age (?) (Age 22.9 = 1.00) 
19.1 2.01 .742 18.4 2.39 .413 
19.7 2.20 .812 19.2 2.86 .495 
20.4 2.36 .871 20.1 3.32 .574 
21.2 2.52 .930 21.0 4.08 .706 
22.0 2.60 .959 21.9 4.22 .730 
22.9 2.71 1.000 22.9 5.78 1.000 
NOTE.-Calculated from table 2 and n. 24. See text for procedure. [he unskilled profile is calculated from the 
basic age profile of table 2, that of the skilled from the basic age profile combined with the skilled ("trade") 
coefficients. 
skilled servant received a term 21 percent shorter than his unskilled 
counterpart. The existence of a sizable premium at such an early age 
could have been due in part to differences in the relative average 
work experience of the skilled and unskilled. Thus, possession of a 
skilled trade at any age implied prior work experience. The age of 
entry into the labor force for those men registered without occupa- 
tions cannot be determined, but it is possible that the typical age of 
entry for the unskilled into employment was that at which English 
boys normally left home to live in service, roughly 15. If this were the 
case, work experience and acquired on-the-job training might have 
accounted for a significant portion of the premium for skilled work- 
ers. This would particularly be true for the younger servants, as the 
relative level of work experience of a skilled to an unskilled worker 
would be greatest at the lower ages observed here and would decline 
with age thereafter. That the ratio of skilled to unskilled net earnings 
increased with age would appear to be strong evidence of the pres- 
ence of formal training for those in the skilled group. 
An interesting feature of the relative age-net-earnings profile of 
the unskilled shown in table 3 is its close resemblance to those profiles 
obtained by Fogel and Engerman for unskilled male slaves in the 
southern United States during 1790-1860 (1972, charts 3 and 4). In 
view of the considerable differences among these samples with re- 
spect to such variables as location and crops cultivated, the similarity 
of the shapes of the profiles might suggest the importance of physio- 
logical factors, particularly the rate of physical maturation, in deter- 
mining the change, with age, in the productivity of unskilled workers 
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under conditions of plantation agriculture in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. 
The relatively small premium paid for the ability to sign in the later 
sample may have been due both to the abundance of literate servants 
and to high literacy rates in the colonies. The decline in the size of the 
reduction of the term due to the ability to sign between the dates of 
the two samples may have resulted in part from a considerable in- 
crease in literacy among the servants, as only 35 percent signed in the 
earlier sample compared with 67 percent in the later one.26 
In both samples, with other characteristics constant, servants bound 
for the West Indies tended to receive shorter terms than those bound 
for mainland colonies. That servants who immigrated to the West 
Indies received shorter terms to compensate them for their choice is 
consistent with the fact that, while both working conditions for ser- 
vants and economic opportunities for freedmen were known to be 
poor in the islands after the introduction of large-scale sugar cultiva- 
tion in the second half of the seventeenth century-with its attendant 
slave gangs and consolidation of small farms into large estates-the 
mainland long continued to be considered a land of opportunity for 
poor immigrants, where freed servants could hope to own land and 
become prosperous members of society. A persistent theme of West 
Indian complaints appeared in a 1675 petition sent to the king of 
England by the Council and Assembly of Barbados: "In former tymes 
Wee were plentifully furnished with Christian [i.e., white] servants 
from England . . . but now Wee can gett few English, having noe Lands 
to give them at the end of their tyme, which formerly was their main 
allurement." The higher mortality rates of the West Indian colonies 
decreased servants' expected productivity and made them reluctant to 
go to the region. However, in conjunction with the high productivity 
of labor in sugar production, those rates acted to raise the demand for 
new flows of replacement immigrant labor. That servants bound for 
the West Indies received terms shorter than those bound for the 
mainland, in spite of the higher mortality rates in the islands, implies 
that the marginal productivity of labor was higher in the West Indies 
than in the mainland colonies.27 
Both the lower estimated intercept for the later sample and the 
estimated negative time trend of' the later sample indicate a secular 
decline in the length of indenture. The direction of change is consis- 
26 On the relationship between ability to sign and other aspects of literacy in this 
period, see Schofield (1968, pp. 311-25). The difference between the coefficients of 
literacy in the two samples is significant at .10 for a two-tailed 1-test. On the servants' 
ability to sign, see Galenson (1979b). 
27 London, Public Record Office 1675. On relative mortality rates in the West Indian 
and mainland colonies, see Wells (1975, pp. 280-82). 
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tent with a number of long-term trends, including rising reservation 
wages of servants due to rising real wages in England between the 
mid-1680s and the middle of the eighteenth century, falling real 
shipping costs, and declining colonial mortality rates which could 
have produced a secular increase in the colonial demand for labor.28 
The negative estimated trend further suggests the presence of a 
secular increase in real wages in the colonies during the period 
spanned by these two samples. 
A consistent seasonal pattern in the length of indenture appears in 
the results of table 2, as servants bound for mainland destinations 
whose indentures were signed between June and November received 
sizable reductions in their terms relative to servants bound in winter 
and spring. Most of these servants were bound for Maryland or 
Virginia, and the observed pattern could have been due to the effect 
of the seasonality of tobacco production on the costs involved in 
supplying servant labor to the Chesapeake. The shipping patterns 
which resulted from the timing of the harvests dictated that the 
amount of backhaul space for servants was greatest in summer and 
early fall. Since servants were provided with food and lodging from 
the time they signed their contracts, the cost of delivering a servant to 
the colonies may have declined in peak shipping seasons because the 
more frequent departures of ships reduced the average waiting time 
in port between binding and sailing. The lower costs of the peak 
seasons could, therefore, have resulted in shorter indentures for 
servants bound in peak seasons than for those bound in slack shipping 
months.29 
Another potential source of variation in the length of indenture was 
annual changes in the colonial demand for labor. The results pre- 
sented in table 2 indicate that the lagged annual average price of 
muscovado sugar in London had a significant and negative effect on 
the length of indentures of servants bound for the West Indies during 
1718-59; the estimated effect of a change in the price of sugar from 
its minimum to its maximum in the period, with other things equal, 
28 On English wages, see Gilboy (1934, pp. 219-25) and Phelps Brown and Hopkins 
(1956, pp. 302-13). On changes in colonial mortality rates, see, e.g., Menard (1977a, 
pp. 99-100). The organization and quality of information in the market for contracts 
may have improved (uring the period spanned by the two samples. It is suggestive that 
the coefficient of variation of the term of indenture among men of a given age was 
considerably lower in the later than the earlier sample for six of the eight age groups of 
minors above the age of 12. On the relation of wage dispersion to information, see 
Stigler (1962). 
29 01 the seasonality of tobacco production and shipping, see Bullock (1649, p. 46); 
Alsop (1666, p. 51); and Bruce (1907, vol. 1, pp. 622-24). On the costs of maintaining 
servants between binding and sailing, see Smith (1947, pp. 36-37, 59-65) and Scottish 
Record Office (GD 23/6/98, nos. 4, 14, 18). For factors relevant to seasonality in the 
colonial demand for labor, see Mullin (1972, p. 15) and Morgan (1975, p. 158). 
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was a reduction of about 5 months in the term of indenture. The sign 
of this effect would be the one predicted if, as appears to have been 
the case, high sugar prices normally resulted from high levels of 
demand for sugar rather than reductions in supply, for high sugar 
prices would then have tended to produce high demand for labor 
and, ceteris paribus, to shorten terms.30 
IV. Conclusions 
The price paid for human capital in the colonial American market 
for indentured servants varied systematically with respect to factors 
which influenced servants' productivity, as economic theory predicts. 
All servants incurred debts of similar value in immigrating to the 
colonies and sold claims on their future labor, in the form of inden- 
tures, to repay these debts. Characteristics which raised the expected 
productivity of servants in the American colonies raised the market 
valuation of their human capital and, therefore, shortened the term 
for which the servant was bound. Thus, servants with skilled trades 
and those able to sign served shorter terms than the unskilled and 
illiterate of similar age and sex. Women were found to have received 
shorter terms than men until the age of 18, perhaps due to their 
earlier maturation. The results also indicated that servants bound for 
the West Indies received shorter terms in compensation for their 
undesirable destinations. Servants bound during peak shipping sea- 
sons were found to have received reduced terms, perhaps due to the 
shorter average waiting time prior to departure in those months when 
backhaul cargo space was most abundant. Finally, the length of inden- 
ture of servants bound for the West Indies was found to have varied 
inversely with the price of sugar, suggesting that increases in the 
colonial demand for labor shortened the term of servitude. 
Among the issues which need further investigation are the precise 
reasons for the observed shapes of the age-earnings profiles of ser- 
vants. Additional research, including the collection of evidence on 
wage rates in the colonies by age and skill, may serve to distinguish 
30 Similar analysis of the contracts of servants bound for the Chesapeake during 
1718-40 indicates that the lagged annual farm price of Maryland tobacco had no 
significant effect on the length of indenture; in a regression equation which included 
the variables of table 2, the estimated coefficient of an interaction term between the 
price of tobacco, lagged 1 year, and Chesapeake destination was insignificant. Due to a 
greater continuing reliance on production of a single staple in the West Indies in the 
eighteenth century, the price of sugar may serve as a better index of the West Indian 
demand for labor than does the price of tobacco for the Chesapeake. On diversification 
of agricultural production in the Chesapeake, see Clemens (1974, pp. 100-148) and 
Stiverson (1977, pp. 65-103). 
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and isolate the effects of such contributory factors as physical matu- 
ration and investment in human capital in producing the age- 
earnings relationships which lay behind the market valuation of in- 
dentured human capital. What the present research has indicated is 
that the application of economic analysis to quantitative evidence 
generated by the system of indentured servitude can provide infor- 
mation on the way in which the market once explicitly evaluated 
stocks of human capital and, in so doing, can yield new insights into 
the operation of labor markets in early America. 
Appendix 
For the Middlesex sample of 1683-84, a regression equation was estimated 
with the amount of the cash payment (in shillings, sterling) made to a servant 
as the dependent variable, with the same independent variables used in the 
analysis of the length of indenture. The sample used was that of all servants, 
minors and adults, whose contracts contained all the necessary information. 
The results are as shown in table A 1. 
The hypothesis that all the coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero can 
be rejected at the .01 level, but the proportion of the variance explained is 
small, as might be expected in view of the rarity of the payments. Only one 
coefficient is significant at the .01 level: Possession of a skilled trade, which 
table 1 shows to have reduced the term of an indenture, significantly raised 
the expected cash payment made to a servant. 
As noted in the text, cash payments appear to have been recorded only for 
minors in the London sample of 1718-59. The form of the payments re- 
corded differs from that of the earlier sample: Whereas the cash payments to 
servants in the Middlesex contracts of 1683-84 appear to have been simple 
lump-sum payments made at the time of binding, those contracted for in 
London in the eighteenth-century sample were generally salaries to be paid 
TABLE Al 
ES-IiMATED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, MIDDLESEX SAMPLE, 1683-84 
Independent Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error 
Age (years) .011 .038 
Sexa -.485 .456 
LiteraCYb -.443 .363 
Trade 1.466 .399 
West Indiesd .088 .354 
Constant .323 
R2 .026 
F 4.03 
n 760 
SOURCE.-London. Greater London Record Office (Middlesex Section). 
aMale = 0, female = 1. 
bMarked = 0, signed = 1. 
cLaborer or no occupation 0; all other occupations 1. 
dWest Indian destinations = 1; mainland = 0. 
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TABLE A2 
EsVIMA1Ei) REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, LONDON SAMPLE, 1718-59 
Independent Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error 
Age (years) .144 .054 
Sex .306 .329 
Literacy .428 .167 
Trade 1.397 .190 
West Indies 1.291 .165 
Constant -3.141 
R2 .)094 
F 42.20 
tl 2,046 
SOURC(E.-Lonldon, Corporation of London Records Office. 
NOTE-All variables defined as in table Al. 
annually in local currency. A regression was estimated with the amount of the 
annual salary (in pounds local currency) as the dependent variable, with the 
same independent variables used above. (The dependent variable is the 
unadjusted value of the colonial currency. Although most of the colonies' 
currencies were devalued relative to sterling, the differences in currency 
values across the principal American colonies in most of this period were 
small. See McCusker 1978.) The sample used was that of all minors (age less 
than 21) whose contracts contained all the necessary information. The results 
were as shown in table A2. 
Fhe relationship is again statistically significant, and the proportion of the 
variance explained is again low. Age, literacy, possession of a skilled trade, and 
West Indian destinations are all significant at .01 and positively related to the 
servant's salary; in table 2 it is shown that all are significantly and negatively 
associated with the length of indenture. 
Ihe results of the analysis of servants' cash payments and salaries in both 
samples are consistent with the hypothesis that these were positively related to 
the servants' expected earnings in the colonies. These results therefore rein- 
force the analysis presented of the length of indenture. 
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